Recent research on trade and multinationals highlights the complex integration strategies and the varying degree of vertical integration of multinational firms in a multilateral world. A high percentage of world trade is actually conducted by multinational firms, and most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs within the block of developed countries. In addition, the most important regional trade agreements (RTAs) are implemented between members of the same block of economies. This paper is concerned with the impact of RTAs on FDI in an interdependent world. Economic interdependence has been shown to decline with geographical distance. Therefore, a spatial econometric approach is used. The paper focuses on the role of the
Introduction
The second half of the last century was characterized by a surge of "bilateralism" in trade policy. The foundation of the European Union (EU, formerly referred to as European Community), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and the Europe Agreements between the EU and several Central and Eastern European countries are some of the most sizeable regional trade agreements (RTAs) that have been implemented within this period. Empirical research on trade issues confirms that this process resulted in a significant increase in bilateral trade volumes among member countries (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, or Glick and Rose, 2002) . At the same time, foreign direct investment (FDI) increased much faster than trade, even within the OECD and among the members of the mentioned RTAs. Although numerous studies on the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade are now available, evidence on impact of bilateral trade policy on FDI seems scarce.
The theory of horizontal multinational firms (Markusen, 1984) assumes that the avoidance of trade impediments (including tariffs but also other modes of trade costs) is a major reason for setting up plants abroad that serve the foreign market locally. By way of contrast, vertical multinational firms (Helpman, 1984) split up the production process across borders to exploit gains from comparative advantage within the firm. Here, the gains from 'outsourcing' of production stages to low-wage countries and the associated trade of intermediate goods within firms are important issues with vertical multinational firms. Therefore, we expect vertical FDI to increase through the implementation of RTAs. Hence, the sign of the coefficient of the RTA variable (typically a dummy variable) in empirical FDI specifications is of interest not only when it comes to determine the role of RTAs for FDI volumes, but also as an indicator of the relative importance of horizontal versus vertical FDI.
More recent theory points to the complex integration strategies of multinational firms, (see Yeaple, 2003 , Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl, 2004 , Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004 , and Raff, 2004 . In particular, this research avoids the restrictive features of models with simple horizontal or vertical multinationals. Whereas it may be optimal to set up foreign subsidiaries in some host countries to serve the consumers only locally there (the horizon-tal motive), it may be optimal for the same firm to set up export platforms in other host countries that serve consumers there and elsewhere. Hence, this theory comes closer to empirical stylized facts of mixed horizontal-vertical integration strategies of multinationals. Three issues with complex multinational firms are of particular interest. First, in a multi-country world it is potentially insufficient to model bilateral FDI as a function of bilateral determinants only. Firms set up their foreign plants in accordance with the characteristics not only in a particular target market but also with the characteristics of other potential host countries. Second, the design of a multinational's production and sales network likely entails strategic aspects of plant location in space. 1 Third, the role of RTAs will be complex with complex FDI. Low trade barriers induce an incentive to export not only for national but also for complex multinational firms (similar to vertical multinationals). However, high trade barriers foster the location of locally selling foreign subsidiaries (similar to horizontal multinationals). Overall, the net effect of a reduction in trade barriers is less clear-cut than with simple forms of the multinational firm organization.
How does empirical work on the impact of RTAs on FDI relate to the theory of multinational firms? Only a few articles address this issue. Blomström and Kokko (1997) report on three case studies. They point out that the implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement lead to a reduction in intra-regional FDI to both the U.S. and Canada (i.e., a negative impact 1 Subsidiaries that produce intermediate goods for other downstream plants within the firm will be located such that the overall delivery costs are minimized. These costs cover both production and trade costs. Also, the location of foreign subsidiaries will not be independent of the location decisions of competing multinationals. on bilateral FDI), whereas it increased extra-regional FDI into Canada (i.e., a positive third-country impact). Similarly, the establishment of NAFTA has fostered extra-regional FDI into Mexico, and Mercosur stimulated extraregional FDI into the member countries. Levy Yeyati, Daude, and Stein (2002a,b) , analyze the impact of RTAs on bilateral FDI stocks in a large sample of countries. They point out that the intra-regional effect of RTAs depends on the prevailing mode of FDI (horizontal, local market seeking versus vertical, low-cost seeking). By way of contrast, an RTA in place renders a host country unambiguously more attractive for extra-regional FDI. Their findings support a significantly positive average impact of regional integration agreements on bilateral FDI. However, Levy Yeyati, Daude, and Stein (2002a,b) do not consider interdependencies across host markets, which are at the heart of this paper's analysis.
The recent empirical literature on the determinants of FDI support a significant impact of interdependencies across markets. Coughlin and Segev (2000) and Naughton (2004, 2005) find that FDI between two countries is not independent of that one in other economies, as expected from a general equilibrium perspective (see Blonigen, 2005 , for a survey). This paper focuses on bilateral outbound FDI stocks within Europe. The sample covers 28 host countries over the period 1989-2001. We allow for three types of spatial interaction: (i) Spatially lagged explanatory variables which are motivated by a three-factor knowledge-capital model (reflecting, e.g., third-country size and relative factor endowment effects on bilateral FDI; see Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2004) ; (ii) spatially lagged endogenous FDI motivated by strategic aspects of the location of FDI in a multilateral world (see also Naughton, 2004, 2005) ; and (iii) spatial autoregressive errors to control for regional interdependencies of stochastic shocks between the host countries. The estimation results illustrate that third-country effects of all three kinds are important and lend support to a complex impact of the European Agreements on FDI.
The findings support a positive effect of the reduction of trade barriers with some host country on FDI into other European host markets. This is consistent with both the prevalence of horizontal, local-market-seeking FDI due to big gains from multiplant economies of scale and the operation of vertical multinational networks that strongly rely on goods trade among their plants in non-distant locations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the specification of bilateral FDI as supported by recent general equilibrium theory. Section 3 provides details on the adopted econometric approach. Section 4 reports the findings regarding the impact of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI, and the last section concludes with a summary of the most important findings.
2 Determinants of bilateral FDI and the role of regional trade agreements Prior research finds that the most important empirical determinants of bilateral multinational activity are country size, skilled labor endowments, trade and investment costs, and the corresponding interaction terms (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003) . The estimated models are often in levels rather than in logs, but the latter approach is typically preferable from an econometric point of view, as pointed out by Mutti and Grubert (2004) . Taking this into account, the log of FDI from country i to country j, y ij , may be formulated as a log-linear function of the following explanatory variables (see Markusen, 2002) . The sum of home and host country GDP, SGDP ij = log GDP i + log GDP j , the similarity between the home and the host market in country size, RGDP ij = (log GDP i − log GDP j ), and four interaction terms to account for the impact of skilled labour endowments (SK) on FDI:
is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the condition in parentheses holds and 0 otherwise;
where DIST ij is the distance between the parent and the host countries' capitals, serving as a proxy for trade costs. Whereas horizontal FDI should rise, if two markets grow larger and become more similar (i.e., SGDP ij and RGDP ij increase), vertical FDI should rise, if the parent country is small and well endowed with skilled labor and trade costs between the two markets are low. Accordingly, we expect a positive sign on the parameter estimates of SGDP ij and RGDP ij but a negative one for all skilled labor endowment interaction terms, IN T 1 ij , ..., IN T 4 ij .
Note that the sample of 24 parent and 28 host countries covers only member countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the ten CEEC that have successfully applied for an EU membership (see the Appendix for a detailed list of these economies). Since there was no change in the composition of the EEA within the considered sample period, its effect is captured by the country-pair dummies. However, 10 Europe Agreements between the EU and a CEEC have been ratified within the considered period. These include the ones with Hungary and Poland in 1994, the ones with Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovak Republic in 1995, the ones with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1998, and the one with Slovenia in 1999 (see the Appendix for further details). We capture these agreements by the dummy variable EA ij that takes the value 1 in all years from the Europe Agreement ratification on for any two involved countries, and zero else. Hence, this dummy variable exhibits time and country-pair variation. Since we control for country-pair and time effects, the corresponding parameter estimate can be interpreted as a difference-in-difference direct effect of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI.
To simplify the exposition of our econometric approach, we collect all mentioned variables in the matrix X n = [SGDP n , RGDP n , INT1 n , ..., INT4 n , EA n ], where X n is an n × k matrix with n being the number of observations and k = 7 denoting the number of variables in X n . The Appendix provides details on the data sources and the descriptive statistics for both the dependent (log bilateral outbound FDI) and the independent variables.
We will also allow for spatial externalities in X n , since bilateral FDI not only depends on the parent and a given host countries' characteristics but also on those of the competing European host markets). For this, we define a spatial weights matrix in the following section which serves to aggregate the characteristics of a host market's competitors. In this way, we are able to account for the possibility that the ratification of a Europe Agreement with a given CEEC may indirectly affect FDI decisions in the other competing host markets in addition to its direct effect on bilateral FDI. Beyond that, we will allow for spatial dependence in FDI itself (see Naughton, 2004, 2005) . This also adds complexity to the impact of the European Agreements on FDI into Europe through the so-called spatial multiplier (i.e., spatial magnification) effects.
Econometric approach -estimation and testing using spatial GM methods
We consider the following first-order SARAR-model: y n = X n α n + W n X n β n + D n µ n + λ n W n y n + u n (1)
where Z n = [X n , W n X n , D n , W n y n ] and δ n = [α n , β n , µ n , λ n ] . The overall number of observations is n = N i=1 T ij , where N denotes the number of country-pairs and T ij is number of years available for country-pair ij. y n is an n × 1 vector of observations of the dependent variable (with elements y ijt = log F DI ijt ), X n is the n × k matrix of explanatory variables, including the Europe Agreements dummy variable EA n . D n is an n × l matrix of (country-pair and time) dummy variables, where l = N + T − 2, with T denoting the number of unique time periods in the sample. W n is a block-diagonal n×n spatial weighting matrix, where each block includes the spatial weight among FDI-hosts for a given parent country at a given point in time.
The diagonal elements of W n are 0 and the off-diagonal elements in a specific year are defined as e −DIST jk c −1 /w * , for j, k = 1,...,N it , where N it denotes the number of covered host countries for a specific parent country i at time t,
and DIST jk is the great circle distance between host countries j and k. c is a normalizing constant which is set to 100. 2 w * is either defined as the row-specific sum of elements
In the former case, the spatial weighting matrix is row-normalized, and in the latter case it is normalized by the maximal row sum as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (2005) . Below, we will discuss the issue of normalization in more detail. Furthermore, δ n is a (2k+l+1)×1 vector of unknown parameters. We refer to X n = W n X n , y n = W n y n , and u n = W n u n as the spatial lags of X n , y n , and u n , respectively.
The parameters λ n and ρ n are the spatial autoregressive parameters. Our empirical analysis rests on a set of low level assumptions given in Kelejian and Prucha (2005) . In particular, these assumptions entail the following: (1) all diagonal elements of W n are zero, the spatial autoregressive parameters are bounded in absolute value, and the matrices I n − λ n W n as well as I n − ρ n W n are nonsingular; (2) the innovations ε ijt,n are independent, Eε ijt,n = 0, and the second and fourth moments exist and are bounded; (3) the row and column sums of the matrices W n , (I n − λ n W n ) −1 , and (I n − ρ n W n ) −1 are uniformly bounded in absolute value. 2 The data set at hand supports values of c that are not substantially higher than 100.
This indicates implicitly that the spatial decay with distance is quite fast.
In case of homoskedastic innovations, Prucha (1999, 2005) derive a two-step GM estimator of ρ n that is based on consistent estimates of the residuals in (1) and on the following moment conditions:
where A 1,n = I n , A 2,n = W n W n , and A 3,n = W n . In particular, the GM estimator of ρ n by Prucha (1999, 2005) can be represented as the solution of the following system of three equations
Defining the empirical analogue as γ n − Γ n θ n , the GM estimator of σ 2 εn and ρ n , labelled as σ 2 εn , ρ n , is given by
where Υ n is a 3 × 3 symmetric positive semidefinite moments weighting matrix. In our case, it is the identity matrix. Kelejian and Prucha (2005) show that this estimator is consistent, if the following two assumptions apply in addition to the previous ones: (4) define the 1 × (2k + l + 1) random vector −z i.,n with ij-th element z ij,n , the (2k + l + 1) × 1 random vector ∆ n = δ n − δ n , and let u ijt,n be the ijt-th element of u n , i.e., the vector of first-step two-stage least-squares residuals; then, for some positive parameter
and n −1/2 ||∆ n || = O p (1); (5) the smallest eigenvalue of Γ n Γ n is uniformly bounded away from zero, Υ n − Υ n = o p (1) with Υ n being a 3 × 3 symmetric positive semidefinite matrix, and the largest (smallest) eigenvalues of Υ n , Υ n are bounded uniformly from above (away from zero). Kelejian and Prucha (2005) formulate two additional assumptions to derive the asymptotic distribution of the GM estimator for ρ n : (6) −n −1 Z n A n u n + n −1 EZ n A n u n = o p (1) is assumed for any n × n real matrix A n with row and columns sums that are uniformly bounded in absolute value; (7) n −1/2 ∆ n = n −1/2 T n ε n + o p (1), where T n is an n × (2k + l + 1) real nonstochastic matrix whose elements are uniformly bounded in absolute value. Most importantly for our application, Kelejian and Prucha (2005) then derive the joint asymptotic distribution of the GM estimator for ρ n and the other model parameters (Ψ o,n ). The empirical counterpart of Ψ o,n is given by
Following Kelejian and Prucha (2005) , it is useful to define the following matrices to derive the one-step GM estimator
where H n denotes the matrix of instruments including the exogenous variables in Z n . Kelejian and Prucha (2005) demonstrate that the three blocks of Ψ o,n can be consistently estimated by (11) for r = 1, 2, 3, where Σ n = σ 2 εn I n under homoskedasticity. Finally, Ψ ρρ,n exhibits typical elements ψ ρρ,n,rs = (2n) −1 tr[(A r,n + A r,n ) Σ n (A s,n + A s,n ) Σ n ] + φ rs (12) n −1 ( F n P n α r,n ) Σ n ( F n P n α s,n )
where µ (4) denotes the fourth centered and stanardized moment of ε ijt /σ εn .
Defining the gradient of the moment conditions with respect to σ 2 εn and ρ n as J n , Kelejian and Prucha (2005) and show that the random vector [n −1/2 ( δ n − δ n ), n −1/2 ( θ n − θ n )] converges in distribution to a normal distribution with variance-covariance matrix Ω o,n .
Hence, hypothesis tests can be based upon this result. In fact, this is useful to test the joint hypothesis of a spatial lag in the error term, the dependent variable and the exogenous explanatory variables in the subsequent empirical analysis.
4 Empirical analysis -the impact of the European Agreements on bilateral FDI in Europe We employ two different spatial weighting schemes. Both of them are based on inverse distances, i.e., the elements of the spatial weighting matrix are given by w jk,n = e −DIST jk /100 w * for all host country pairings j = k. The two weighting schemes differ with respect to the normalization method, but both of them guarantee that the above assumptions apply. Most of the existing applications of spatial econometric models rely on row-normalized matrices W n . However, Kelejian and Prucha (2005) point out that it is sufficient to normalize all entries of W n by the largest eigenvalue or, alternatively, by the largest row-sum of W n . Whereas row-normalization imposes strong restrictions on the spatial process, since each row of W n is normalized differently, the normalization suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (2005) ables. This restrictive assumption is relaxed in Models 2 and 3, where we allow for the three modes of spatial interaction to have an impact on FDI.
First, host markets of a given direct investor are likely interdependent which can be accounted for through the inclusion of an endogenous spatial lag (see also Coughlin and Segev, 2000, or Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2004 , for a motivation and an application). Second, in a multi-country world not only bilateral relative and absolute factor endowments (i.e., country size)
matter, but endowments of all competing host markets are relevant (see also Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1995, and Naughton, 2004 , for the inclusion of the impact of exogenous explanatory variables of adjacent/non-distant locations of FDI). 5 Neglecting these two types of spatial interaction leads to biased parameter estimates. Beyond that, there may be spatial dependence in the stochastic innovations in the sense that stochastic shocks on FDI into host markets spill over to their most important (i.e., non-distant) competitors. An ignorance of this latter mode of spatial interdependence does not affect the consistency but the efficiency of the parameter estimates.
Model 2 relies on row-normalized spatial weights, being less suitable from a theoretical point of view than Model 3, which does not. Our estimation results in Table 1 We decompose the change in outbound FDI for each Europe Agreement ratification year separately. For each of these years, the direct and the indirect effects on FDI are displayed in the first two of the corresponding columns.
The respective third column displays the overall, magnified direct plus indirect effects. The difference between the third and the sum of the first two columns is an approximate measure of the effect induced by the spatial multiplier (I i,t,n −0.761W i,t,n ) −1 . However, this approximation may be inaccurate, since the arithmetic sum differs considerably from the geometric one with the data at hand (i.e., the sums of the components do not add up exactly to the overall effect due to the inherent nonlinearities).
By and large, Table 2 indicates that the indirect impact on Germany's FDI into the CEEC exceeds that of its FDI into the WEC, on average.
Among the WEC, Austria (being adjacent to Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) as well as Finland and Sweden (being non-distant from the Baltic states) experienced large negative indirect effects from the Europe Agreement ratifications. However, the CEEC are on average closer to other CEEC than to the WEC, which renders the indirect effects even stronger there. The overall effect (i.e., the spatial multiplier magnification of the combined direct and indirect effects) is nonnegative for each individual host country. The reason for this is that the indirect effects are relatively small and are outweighed by the spillovers from positive direct effects in the CEEC, even for the WEC. Altogether, the ratification of the Europe Agreements lead to an advantage for those host economies that are geographically close to the ones that ratified an agreement. This holds true for Austria (1994, 1995, and 1999) , as well as Finland and Sweden (1998).
> Figures 1-4 < Table 2 provides a dissection of the overall effect of the Europe Agreements on Germany's outbound FDI for each ratification period (1994, 1995, 1998, 1999) , Figures 1-4 Figure 4: 1999) . We define the spatial effects as the difference between the vector of the overall effects and the direct effects, (I GER,t,n − 0.761W GER,t,n ) −1 (0.565I GER,t,n − 0.401W GER,t,n ) ∆EA GER,t,n −0.565 ∆EA GER,t,n . This accounts for the scope of effects that are entirely due to spatial interaction. As before, the outcome is expressed in percent of Germany's bilateral outbound FDI. In each agreement year, the overall spatial effects are strongest for both CEEC and WEC countries that are adjacent or close to the CEEC that ratified an agreement in the respective
year. Among the WEC, the positive spatial effects are biggest for Austria, Finland, and Sweden, and they reach their lowest values for the WEC at the Western boundary of Europe. However, the figures also illustrate that the overall spatial effects decline slowly in space, so that sizable effects can be observed not only in the adjacent countries.
In 1994, the difference between the smallest (in Iceland) and the highest (Austria and Slovak Republic) overall spatial effects amounts to more than 
Conclusions
This paper analyses the role of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI within Europe. These agreements were designed to liberalize trade between the EU member countries on the one hand and the Central and Eastern European economies that had applied for EU membership on the other hand. Our analysis indicates that regional trade agreements are important for bilateral FDI. General equilibrium theory points to the interdependence of economies.
By and large we would expect FDI activities across adjacent host markets to be complementary if local foreign market seeking motives dominate (i.e., if horizontal FDI prevails and the multiplant economies of scale are huge).
By way of contrast, if low-cost seeking motives are the driving force behind FDI (i.e., vertical motives dominate), we would expect the activities to be substitutive across adjacent host markets since multinational firms will then tend to supply their goods not only to consumers in that host market. However, even vertical FDI may be complementary across adjacent host markets if the vertical integration structure of multinationals entails sizable intra-firm trade in goods across production plants.
In general, the interdependence of the host markets will be related to their geographic proximity. Hence, the empirical analysis of bilateral FDI needs to account for third market influences that decline in geographical proximity. Accordingly, it seems natural to apply recently developed methods for spatially dependent data. In this paper, we apply GM methods developed by Prucha (1999, 2005) for estimation and testing. In particular, we apply joint hypothesis tests regarding the three possible modes of spatial autocorrelation: in the dependent variable, in the exogenous determinants, and in the stochastic innovations.
In our sample of bilateral outbound FDI stocks within Europe, we find strong evidence for a positive direct impact of the Europe Agreements on FDI. But our results also indicate that all three modes of spatial dependence are present in the data. This leads to non-trivial effects of the Europe Bulgaria (1995 ), Czech Republic (1995 , Estonia (1998 ), Hungary (1994 , Latvia (1998) , Lithuania (1998 ), Poland (1994 , Romania (1995) , Slovak Republic (1995), Slovenia (1999).
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